Abstract-Smart devices capture users' activity such as unlock failures, application usage, location and proximity of devices in and around their surrounding environment. This activity information varies between users and can be used as digital fingerprints of the users' behaviour. Traditionally, users are authenticated to access restricted data using long term static attributes such as password and roles. In this paper, in order to allow secure and seamless data access in mobile environment, we combine both the user behaviour captured by the smart device and the static attributes to develop a novel access control technique. Security and performance analyses show that the proposed scheme substantially reduces the computational complexity while enhances the security compared to the conventional schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recently Google introduced a new authentication technique called smart lock for its Android Lollipop mobile operating system. This new feature provides seamless access to the device without compromising the security i.e., devices are secured from intruders but also easy to unlock when a security check has been made. This smart lock allows Android based smart phones to bypass lock screen security when it is connected to trusted devices via Bluetooth or NFC or located in trusted locations 1 . Smart devices are now embedded with numerous sensors and capable of capturing more sophisticated information about the user's day-to-day activity on top of the trusted locations and trusted devices such as app usage, charging pattern, temperature, lighting, etc [1] , [2] .
The aim of this paper is to exploit the above sensor data to develop a novel seamless data sharing technique for mobile devices. In general, the data sharing involves three parties i.e., owners, (mobile) users, and storage server. Traditionally, we assume these three are in the same domain and also that the server is fully trusted. In the recent trend towards cloud computing and outsourcing environments, we cannot rely on the traditional data sharing setup since the data confidentiality is not guaranteed within third party cloud environments. To overcome this challenge, the data confidentiality in a cloud environment is achieved via the attribute based encryption (ABE) technique [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] .
ABE is considered as a promising cryptographic technique and supports both the data confidentiality and access control simultaneously [3] , [4] , [5] , [6] . Using ABE, the data owners can encrypt the data using fine-grained access policies. For instance, let us assume that an employer uploads an encrypted file to the cloud using ABE, where the access policy of that file 1 https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/6093922?hl=en-GB is defined using the following attributes and functions AND and OR: "Manager" OR "Finance Office" AND "Company A". Hence, an employee who is a "Manager" employed at "Company A" can decrypt the file. The data confidentiality in the ABE schemes relies only on predefined static attributes such "Manager", "Finance Office", and "Company A". Similar to the smart lock feature, we note that it is also possible to incorporate the device sensor data i.e., trusted locations, devices etc (lets call them as dynamic attributes) within ABE to provide seamless data sharing within mobile environments. This feature not only improves the user experience but also the security. Consider the previous example, where an employee has the long term credentials for the following attributes: "Manager", and "Company A". Thus, she could also access the encrypted file while she is traveling in public transport using her personnel mobile device. However, the risk level associated with this context is high. In fact, people in her proximity might easily see confidential data via shoulder surfing. It is also possible for an adversary to steal the employee's mobile device, and get unauthorized access to the corporate data if there is no real-time verification (assuming that the credentials for static attributes are stored within the mobile). Hence, evaluating the data collected by smart devices' sensors in realtime provides an additional layer of security.
II. RELATED WORK ABE was firstly proposed by Sahai and Waters in [3] . At high level, ABE can be divided into two: single authority and multi-authority. In a single authority scenario, there is only one attribute authority (AA) which monitors all attributes of users and issues encryption and decryption credentials for the data owners and users. This single authority becomes a fully trusted party to which the users have to prove their attributes in order to obtain the decryption credentials. In such a case, the AA has too much power and it can decrypt all the data and knows about all the users' attributes. This is one of the limitations in single authority ABE scheme. In order to overcome this single point-of-failure, multi-authority ABE schemes were proposed in [7] , [8] . Chase et. al. [7] presented a MA-ABE scheme, which allows any polynomial number of independent authorities to monitor attributes and distribute decryption keys. However [7] requires a central authority to monitor all other AAs; hence vulnerable for single point of failure similar to single AA schemes. In order to fully decentralise the MA-ABE scheme, Chase and Chow proposed a decentralised scheme by removing the central authority [8] .
However the scheme in [8] is not fully decentralised since if an AA joins or leaves the system then the whole ABE system needs to reboot by assigning new keys to users. Lewko and Waters [9] proposed a fully decentralized ABE scheme, where users could have zero or more attributes from each AA and do not require a trusted server. In their work, the AA can join and leave freely without re-initializing the system. However, the above (centralised) ABE schemes do not support user privacy i.e., users need to reveal their identities to AAs before retrieving credentials for their attributes. In order to overcome this limitation, a privacy-preserving MA-ABE scheme was proposed by Han et al. in [11] . In contrast to the existing decentralized ABE schemes, the scheme in [11] preserves the user privacy. In [11] , the Global Identifier (GID) of the user is used to tie all the decryption keys together, where a blind key generation protocol has been used to issue the decryption keys. Hence, corrupted AAs cannot pool the users' attributes by tracing the GIDs' of the users from the decryption keys.
None of the above ABE schemes exploit the features of smart phones or devices to support smart access control framework. The work in [10] combined the centralised ABE schemes [7] , [8] and features of smart devices to enhance the data access in the mobile environment. Since the centralised ABE schemes do not preserve the users' privacy, the same privacy vulnerability exists in [10] . Furthermore, as the smart devices extract substantial amount of users' activity information, any solution without privacy protection will endanger the adoption of new technology. In order to overcome this issue, we propose a new scheme in this paper which incorporates smart devices' dynamic attributes with the static attributes of privacy-preserving decentralised ABE scheme. To achieve this, we modify the scheme in [11] in order to appropriately incorporate the dynamic attributes and to avoid user collusion [12] . Later in this paper, we perform extensive numerical analysis and security analysis to show that the proposed scheme is quicker and secure.
A. Preliminaries
Bilinear Pairings: Let G 1 , G 2 be two multiplicative groups of prime order q and let g 1 and g 2 be generators of G 1 and G 2 , respectively. Let us denote a bilinear map e : G 1 × G 2 → G T . The map has the following three properties:
e(x, y) = 1. 3) Computability:ê is an efficient computation.
Lagrange Interpolation: Shamir's secret sharing uses the Lagrange interpolation technique to obtain the secret from shared-secrets. Suppose that p(x) ∈ Z p [x] is a (k − 1) degree polynomial and secret s = p(0). Let us denote S = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x k } and the Lagrange coefficient for
, the polynomial p(x) can be reconstructed as follows,
hence the secret s can be obtained as:
Mapping: We consider a linear comparison function namely mapping denoted as M . This function takes two inputs: one from smart device sensors (i.e., location) and the second one from the data owner. The data owner must embed the required sensor data and boolean operations. The output of the mapping function is "yes" or "no" by comparing both the inputs. For example, this function can extract data from smart device's GPS module and compare with locations in the data owner's input and output "yes" or "no" i.e., M ("data f rom GP S" = "London") = no. It should be noted that this function can be embedded securely within any smartphone apps which call required sensors at device level. Similar to the XACML policy language, the data owner can even define a range of values for the sensor data. However the data owner needs to embed a boolean function with the data to expedite the comparison process.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT A. System Architecture
The proposed system consists of the following four components: mobile users (or employees), data owner (or organizations), cloud service provider, and AAs.
Mobile Users are equipped with one or more smart devices. Data Owners upload the encrypted data to the cloud storage and define access policies. In our scheme, the data owner defines access policies based on static attributes obtained from the AA together with dynamic attributes. Thus, the data owner can decide who is able to decrypt the data from where and in what circumstances.
Cloud Service Providers provide cloud storage and computational power to both the users and data owners. In our scheme, we assume that the data owner will upload the encrypted data to the storage while the user will download the encrypted data from the storage.
Attribute Authorities (AA) manage and maintain static attributes of the users. Different authorities manage different sets of attributes. A user needs to prove her attributes to the authorities in order to receive the decryption key for each attribute from the corresponding authority. In the proposed scheme, it should be noted that for the dynamic attributes, there is no need to have an AA to distribute encryption and decryption credentials e.g., for the location attribute the device uses the GPS module to obtain longitude and latitude.
B. Decentralized Attribute Based Encryption
In this section, we present a variant of the decentralized KP-ABE scheme [11] . In a decentralized scheme, it is not necessary to maintain a fixed number of AAs. Any AA can join and/or leave the system at any time without rebooting the system. First of all, we will explain sub-algorithms followed by the privacy-preserving decentralized KP-ABE in Fig. 1 .
C. Sub-algorithms
The decentralised ABE contains five sub-algorithms namely global setup, authority setup, key issuing, encryption and decryption. Let us briefly explain the functionalities of each sub-algorithm. Global Setup: This algorithm takes a security parameter as input and outputs system parameters. These system parameters can be used by authorities who join the system. Authority Setup: Each AA uses the system parameters obtained from the global setup to generate public and private keys for the attributes it maintains. Key Issuing: User and AA interact via an anonymous key issuing protocol in order to determine a set of attributes which belong to the user. Then AA generates decryption credentials for those attributes and sends them to the user. Encryption: The encryption algorithm takes a set of attributes maintained by AA and the data as input. Then it outputs the ciphertext of the data. Decryption: The decryption algorithm takes the decryption credentials received from AAs and the ciphertext as input. The decryption will be successful if and only if the user attributes satisfy the access structure.
Detailed description of each step involved in Fig. 1 is provided after Fig. 2 .
D. Security and Privacy Threats
There are a number of known security and privacy threats which hinder the access control schemes. Let us provide a list of potential attacks and relate them to the requirements of the system.
• Identity-related threats: The main threat we need to consider is related to the identities of the elements involved in the protocol. The adversary might impersonate as one of the entities and try to establish a connection to a legitimate entity.
• Collusion attacks: Each AA manages a set of attributes in our system, hence, authorities can collude with each other to infer user attributes. This will allow the malicious authorities to profile the user based on different sets of attributes that the user has with the malicious authorities. Similarly, two users can collide and get access to data which are not accessible by the users individually.
• Dynamic attribute cheating: Smart devices capture dynamic attributes such as unlock failures, app usage, location and near by devices using the local sensors. It is crucial for the data owner to ensure that the user's device is not modified (rooted) or tampered in order to feed false dynamic attributes. Hence, we need to consider a set of technologies in order to guarantee that no attribute cheating is possible.
We explain how our new algorithm mitigates all these threats in the security and privacy analysis section later in this paper.
IV. DYNAMIC AND STATIC ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
A. Proposed Scheme
In contrast to the conventional ABE scheme described in Fig. 1 , we will show in this section how to efficiently incorporate the dynamic attributes to the conventional ABE scheme, where the data owner can encrypt the data by not only using the credentials obtained from the AA, but also using dynamic attributes such as location, time, temperature, noise, light, the presence of other devices, a particular interaction between the user and the smartphone, or a combination of these. Similar to the conventional ABE, the proposed algorithm is also composed of four sub-algorithms namely setup, key issuing, encryption, and decryption. The proposed algorithm is given in Fig. 2 .
Let us consider a system which contains N number of AAs (i.e., we denote them as A 1 , . . . , A N ). The attribute set managed by the authority A k is denoted as A k = {a k,1 , . . . , a k,n k } ∀k. Each AA is also assigned a value d k i.e., user must have at least d k number of attributes of this authority in order to retrieve the private key associated with this AA. Initially, for a given security parameter λ, the global setup algorithm (GS) generates the bilinear groups G 1 and G 2 with prime order p i.e., {G 1 , G 2 } ← GS(1 λ ). The authority setup algorithm (AS) is executed by each AA to randomly generate public keys (P K) and the corresponding private keys (SK). The public-private key pairs for A k are given as
Let us denote the attribute set belonging to user u as A u and the common attribute set between user u and authority k as A k u i.e., A k u = A u A k . The key generation (KG) algorithm will be used to issue decryption keys to the user u with a set of attributes A u as shown in Fig. 2 .
Let us denote the set of static attributes used to encrypt message m as A m and the common attribute set between message m and the authority k as A k m i.e., A m = { A 1 m , . . . , A k m , . . . , A N m }. Denote the dynamic attribute as A C = {a a,1 , . . . , a a,n } where a a,i . Let us also denote the index set of authorities involved in the ciphertext of message m as I c . The encryption algorithm (E) encrypts the message m ∈ G 2 using an attribute set A m . The data owner also computes M (a a,1 )||M (a a,2 )|| . . . ||M (a a,n . In order to encrypt the message, the message owner randomly generates s and computes ciphertext C = C 1 , C 2 , C 3 , C k,j , ∀a k,j ∈ A k m . If the user has decryption keys for the attributes of message m then he can obtain the message m from the ciphertext using the following four steps by executing the decryption algorithm (D) as shown in Fig. 2 .
The novelty in our scheme compared to the conventional ABE scheme lies in the encryption and the decryption sub-algorithms in Fig. 2 . For the sake of simplicity, let us consider the following three dynamic attributes: a a,1 ="location", a a,2 ="risk level associated with her recent app usage" and a a,3 ="unlock failures in last two days". Now the data owner defines A C = {a a,1 = "LON DON ", a a,2 < "3" and a a,3 < "2" } and computes C 1 = m.h (M (a a,1 )||M (a a,2 )|| . . . ||M (a a,n ) ).
Global Setup GS For a given security parameter λ, GS generates the bilinear groups G1 and G2 with prime order p as follows: {G1, G2} ← GS(1 λ ). Let e : G1 × G1 −→ G2 be a bilinear map and g, h and h1 be the generators of G1 such that ∀ x, y ∈ G1 and ∀ a, b ∈ Zp, e(x a , y b ) = e(x, y) ab . There are N number of authorities {A1, . . . , AN }: A k monitors n k attributes i.e. A k = {a k,1 . . . , a k,n k }, ∀k. Authorities Setup AS Security parameters of A k :
A k specify m k as minimum number of attributes required to satisfy the access structure ( m k ≤ n k ). Key Generation KG Collision-Resistant Hash Function H : {0, 1} * → Zp to generate u from the user global identity. Attribute set of user isÃu:Ãu ∩Ã k =Ã k u ∀ k. A k generates r k,u ∈R Zp and polynomial qx for each node x (including the leaves) T. For each node x, the degree dx of the polynomial qx is dx = kx − 1 where kx -threshold value of that node. Now, for the root node r, set qr(0) = r k,u . For any other node x, set qx(0) = q parent(x) (index(x)). Now decryption keys for the user u are generated as follows:
Encryption E Attribute set for the message m isÃm:Ãm ∩Ã k =Ã 
where Ic denotes the index set of the authorities. Decryption D In order to decrypt C, the user u, computes X, Y and Q k as follows:
. User then decrypts the message m as Fig. 1 . The decentralized key-policy attribute-based encryption scheme [11] .
Global Setup GS same as conventional method. Authorities Setup AS same as conventional method. Key Generation KG same as conventional method. Encryption E Attribute set for the message m isÃm: ||M (aa,n) ).
where Ic denotes the index set of the authorities. Hence the date owner uploads the ciphertext C = [C1, C2, C k,j ] into the cloud. Decryption D User downloads C from the cloud and checks the required attributes to decrypt m. In order to decrypt C, the user u, computes X, Y and Q k as follows:
. Now the mobile device computes h (M (a a,1 )||M (a a,2 )|| . . . ||M (a a,n ) ). User can decrypt the data as follows (only if h(M (a a,1 )||M (a a,2 )|| . . . ||M (a a,n )) = h(M (aa,1)||M (aa,2)|| . . . ||M (aa,n))) User then decrypts the message m as follows: Fig. 2 . The proposed scheme. us assume that the risk level varies between 1 to 10 where higher risk is denoted by a larger value. However, different organizations may define the risk level based on their own standards. For example, if a particular document is highly classified then, the organization sets high risk values for that document compared to that of ordinary documents.
In the decryption phase the mapping function M inputs the data owner's dynamic attribute requirements and smart device readings and outputs yes or no , e.g., if the current risk level is less than the threshold defined by the data owner then M (a a,2 < "3") = yes. This ensures that even if a user has all the credentials from AA, dynamic attributes enforced by the data owner must be satisfied before the decryption. If h(measured value) = h(data owner s predef ined values) then decryption will be successful.
V. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we compare the computation costs associated with the proposed scheme in Fig. 2 against the conventional scheme in Fig. 1 . In the proposed or in the conventional scheme, the user is involved in the computation during the decryption step and the data owner is involved in the encryption step. We can ignore the computational costs involved in the setup and key-issuing steps since these can be done off line. Since the computational cost for hash functions is negligible compared to pairing and exponentiation, let us denote the computational time (in ms) for one multiplication, one exponentiation, and one pairing as C m , C ex , and C p , respectively.
For comparison, we use the benchmark time values given in the popular pairing-based cryptography library namely jPBC 2 . Table I shows the time values (in ms) for C m , C ex , and C p for two different testbeds: testbed 1 uses Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Quad CPU Q6600 with 2.40GHz and 3 GB memory running on Ubuntu 10.04 and testbed 2 uses HTC Desire HD A9191 smart phone running on Android 2.2. Let us assume that the data owner uses an environment similar to the testbed 1 for the encryption while the user uses a mobile device similar to the testbed 2 for the decryption. Let us denote the number of static attributes used for encryption as n per authority and the total number of dynamic attributes used by data owner as n d . Table II shows the total time required for encryption (by the data owner) and for decryption (by the user) for the proposed and the conventional ABE schemes. In order to graphically visualize the actual difference between proposed and conventional algorithms, we plotted the computational complexities given in Table II by varying the number of attributes, n + n d , in Figures 3-6 .
The computational complexity is measured in terms of total time required for the data owner and the user to encrypt and decrypt the data, respectively. Figures 3-6 depict four different cases (a) encryption with three dynamic attributes and static attributes vary from 1 to 7, (b) encryption with five dynamic attributes and static attributes vary from 1 to 5, (c) decryption with three dynamic attributes and static attributes vary from 1 to 7, and (d) decryption with five dynamic attributes and static attributes vary from 1 to 5. With three and five dynamic attributes (see Fig. 3 and Fig. 4) , the proposed algorithm performs 1ms and 3ms faster than the conventional scheme, respectively for encryption. This clearly shows that incorporating more dynamic attributes speed up the encryption. Similarly for the decryption with three dynamic attributes (Fig. 5) , the proposed scheme performs nearly 1500ms faster than conventional scheme and for five dynamic attributes (Fig. 6) , the proposed scheme performs nearly 2500ms faster than conventional schemes. This substantial reduction in decryption time enable seamless access to the data for mobile environment. Remarks: One of the drawbacks of the existing ABE schemes is that the complexity increases linearly with the number of static attributes. Since our algorithm was built on top of existing ABE schemes the same follows. If the data owner wants to use AAs to issue credentials for dynamic attributes then complexity will increase linearly since those dynamic attributes become static attributes. However, in our solution, as seen from Figures 3-6 , any number of dynamic attributes can be added for negligible cost. Hence the complexity in the case of our scheme can be reduced by reducing the number of static attributes and adding more dynamic attributes used for encryption. For example, instead of including ten static attributes from AAs, it is possible in our scheme that the data owner can include five static attributes from AAs and another five dynamic attributes. This approach halves the complexity. Yet, the proposed scheme adds an additional layer of security on top of the conventional schemes. In a nutshell, the proposed scheme does not degrade the performance of conventional ABE while including the dynamic attributes to provide runtime security to the data owner's data.
VI. SECURITY AND PRIVACY ANALYSIS
In Section III-D, we categorized the possible security and privacy threats to the proposed algorithms. In this section, we FIG. 1 AND THE PROPOSED SCHEME IN FIG. 2 Decentralized ABE Scheme in Fig. 1 Proposed
address each issue and validate that our algorithm is robust against those security and privacy threats.
Mitigate Identity Threat As shown in Fig. 2 , public-keys associated with AAs will be published online and the corresponding private-keys are known only to the AAs. At the same time, due to the intractability of the Diffie-Hellman problem, it is infeasible to compute private-keys from public-keys. During the encryption and decryption, data owners and users use AAs. Data owners and users can verify the public-keys using wellknown techniques such as certificates. Hence, impersonating AA is not possible. A user device might be at the possession of an attacker where user static attribute credentials are stored on the device. However, the adversary cannot get access in to the network without satisfying the dynamic attributes introduced in this paper. Adversary behavior may not be similar as the legitimate user, hence, the mapping function running in the user device increases the risk level which will eventually alert the network to deny the service request.
Mitigate Collusion Attacks Two different types of collusion attacks are possible: 1) AAs can collude with each other and aggregate the user attributes, 2) users can pool their decryption keys to access the data which cannot be accessed by individual users. Since our schemes were built on top of the conventional ABE scheme, the proposed schemes are also collusion resistant against up to (N − 2) AAs. Hence, let us discuss the user collusion. During the key issuing subalgorithms, due to the inherent anonymous key issuing protocol, user u will obtain only D kj = g R kj 1 y xj /(s kj +u) k where user identity u is incorporated within the decryption key by inverse exponentiation operation after adding u with random value s kj (known only to authority). From the intractable Diffie-Hellman problem, it is infeasible to infer x j /(s kj +u) from y xj /(s kj +u) k . Moreover, the user identity was randomized by s kj , thus it is infeasible to modify u with another user's identity.
Mitigate Dynamic Attribute Cheating The mapping function installed in the mobile device can be used to verify whether the current user is the legitimate user of the mobile device. However, since it is installed within user's device, malicious users might modify this in order to feed false information for dynamic attributes. Recent technology development in smart device industry already has some working prototype for this kind of security vulnerability i.e., Samsung's KNOX and Blackberry's BES 34 . These software platforms are capable of securely installing apps on the users' mobile devices and check for integrity of the installed apps without user interruption. Hence, modifying an app in order to feed false information can be easily detected by the data owner using systems such as KNOX or BES.
